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Abstract
The current work addresses a virtual environment with self-replicating agents whose
decisions are based on a form of “somatic computation” (soma - body) in which
basic emotional responses, taken in parallelism to actual living organisms, are in-
troduced as a way to provide the agents with greater reflexive abilities. The work
provides a contribution to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life
(ALife) in connection to a neurobiology-based cognitive framework for artificial
systems and virtual environments’ simulations. The performance of the agents ca-
pable of emotional responses is compared with that of self-replicating automata,
and the implications of research on emotions and AI, in connection to both vir-
tual agents as well as robots, is addressed regarding possible future directions and
applications.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Life, Somatic Computation, Emo-
tional Responses, Awareness.
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1 Introduction
The combined research in Artificial Life (ALife) and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) allows one to address the coevolution of intelligence in artificial sys-
tems, namely by providing artificial organisms with different degrees of re-
flexiveness, one can test how basic toolkits of cognitive responses, linked to
reflexivity and adaptation to survival contexts, can be more or less effec-
tive in terms of the adaptability of those artificial organisms, and, therefore,
provide better tools for simulation of complex adaptive systems as well as
solutions for technologies based on evolutionary computation [1, 2].
ALife, thus, allows one to deepen theoretical research in AI, introducing
a main central point: a basic survival problem common to living systems,
in the sense that life and death can be incorporated in the artificial envi-
ronment through birth (introduction of new artificial organisms), living (the
interactive and evolutionary dynamics of the artificial organisms) and dying
(the removal of artificial organisms). The possible parallelism between arti-
ficial systems and the grounding work for ALife can be traced to what can
be called von Neumann’s artificial life conjecture, which is argued by von
Neumann in his work on the general and logical theory of automata [3].
Each artificial organism’s AI, in turn, must be linked to the manage-
ment of the “life” of the organism, anticipating problems, avoiding dangers,
adapting to environmental conditions and trying to keep the organism alive.
In this sense, we can deal with artificial organisms as integrated systemic
wholes that adapt to an environment. A point that can be generalized to
both artificial virtual organisms as well as to physical agents like robots [1].
The AI of an artificial organism results from a system of programmed
rules, linked to the artificial organism’s adaptive interface with the environ-
ment and to that organism’s ability to: perceive, capture, select and process
data and knowledge, producing cognitive syntheses upon which the artificial
organism can act towards ensuring its survival. In this sense, the program-
ming of such an AI involves a form of basic somatic computation, a point
that is present in many ALife models [1].
One can speak of knowledge at the artificial agent’s level, in the sense of a
resulting cognitive synthesis proceeding from an organizing adaptive compu-
tational activity that is directed towards the agent’s survival and adaptation.
The programmed rules furnish a basic adaptive toolkit that must be linked
to a sensory system of the artificial organism, allowing it to adapt to different
situations. The entire structure of the organism’s makeup and AI introduce,
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at the artificial level, a basic dynamics of intentionality in common with
actual physical living systems, indeed, dynamics of intentionality can be
localized in any entity that may be considered an agent dispositionally gifted
of strategically operative internal structures, a point that applies to ALife’s
artificial organisms.
The programmed AI rules, being linked to an artificial organism’s sur-
vival, introduce, at the artificial level, a link between the “life/living” of the
artificial organism and that organism’s “agency”, that is: in a similar way to
an actual physical living organism, the artificial organism’s actions concur
to a single purpose: adaptation towards survival, such that the artificial or-
ganism is directed towards the others, the environment and its own survival,
which resends to a notion of intentionality that can be invoked as effectively
applicable at the artificial level.
The present work addresses these issues, working with a variant of Hol-
land’s Echo [4, 5, 6]. We introduce three types of self-replicating artificial
organisms:
• Plantoids: plant-like organisms that are fixed in a two-dimensional
game terrain that produce energy resources and that replicate, com-
peting for territory by spreading the replicas;
• Cog-0 mobile agents: cog-0 are self-replicating mobile agents (or m-
agents for short) that feed from the plantoids and from other m-agents,
these cog-0 m-agents follow closely Holland’s Echo rules, they have a
very basic level of agency, being mostly mechanical, their adaptive in-
terface results from their genetic makeup and their interface structure;
• Cog-1 mobile agents: cog-1 are also self-replicating m-agents, sharing
basic characteristics in common to cog-0, but are also programmed with
higher degrees of reflexivity, namely in terms of simulated emotional
responses, including: desire to feed, desire to replicate and fear.
It is important to stress that the cog-1’s emotional responses are assumed
by cognitive parallelism with basic human emotional responses, that is, we
programmed adaptive responses and levels of perception that furnish cog-1
agents with an adaptive toolkit that has a survival-prone calculatory basis,
synthesizable by parallelism in terms of what, in humans, are considered as
basic emotional responses in survival contexts.
The underlying conceptual ground for this work comes from von Neu-
mann [3], integrating Damásio’s work in neurobiology, regarding the role of
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emotions in human cognition and decision dynamics [7]. It is not, however,
our purpose to simulate human agents in the cog-1 agents, instead, it is our
purpose to introduce a basic adaptive computation that leads to adaptive
responsive patterns of cog-1s that have a similarity to the adaptive respon-
sive patterns associated, in humans, with emotional responses in survival
situations [7].
The reason to introduce such adaptive responsive patterns, in this model,
is to test the results of interactions and coevolution between different artifi-
cial life forms with different types of AI, corresponding to different degrees
of awareness and adaptability, which may be relevant for both simulation of
artificial societies as well as for intelligent systems’ design, regarding possible
approaches to introduce different degrees of autonomy and reflexivity that
may help in applications of adaptive computation, amplifying the adaptabil-
ity of intelligent systems1.
In the model, for instance, while cog-0 automata “simply” feed, cog-1
agents are responsive to their internal body state, in the sense that they
evaluate their need to eat, synthesizable in the calculation of a “desire to feed”,
on the other hand, they simultaneously evaluate the immediate surroundings
and deliberate on what they should do, so that their actions respond to basic
survival questions: to where should they move? Should they attack another
replicator to steal its resources, or should they avoid that attack, taking into
account the potential prey’s strengths?
Motion for cog-1 agents is directed towards places with higher energy
resources (it always moves to “greener pastures”). In conflict situations, on
the other hand, a cog-1 agent observes a potential prey and evaluates whether
or not attacking it is advantageous, a calculatory dynamics is introduced,
such that the cog-1 observes the potential prey and anticipates the result of a
confrontation, signalized in terms of a fear versus desire cognitive dynamics:
the desire to feed from a potential prey overcomes the fear from physical
confrontation, whenever the prey is not stronger than the attacking agent, on
the other hand, if the potential prey is stronger, then the fear of confrontation
overcomes the desire to feed from the prey’s energy resources, and the cog-1
does not attack.
The simulated emotional responses are, in this case, linked to survival-
prone adaptive responses. The conceptual ground that allows us to address
1 The issue of awareness and even self-awareness will be returned to later on, when
addressing cog-1s adaptive cognition.
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these adaptive responses as emotional responses in artificial systems is ad-
dressed in section 2. The purpose of the model is to evaluate the emerging
coevolutionary patterns between cog-0 and cog-1 agents and under what con-
ditions does cog-1 type of adaptive computation become advantageous.
In section 2, the model is introduced. In section 3, the performance
of cog-1 versus cog-0 systems is addressed through model simulations for
different parameters. In section 4, the results of the model’s simulations
and of the model’s structure are addressed in a wider context of the issue
of simulating basic emotional responses in artificial systems and the possible
benefits of such simulation, to incorporate in these systems greater degrees of
autonomy and adaptiveness, so that these systems can apply a basic toolkit to
different situations, increasing the “plasticity” of their adaptive computation.
A discussion of the Echo model in connection to the Kismet robot project is
also provided in section 4.
2 The model
The model incorporates as basis Holland’s Echo, so that we have an artificial
environment comprised of a terrain organized in patches2, forming a square
lattice with periodic conditions at the borders. Each patch is occupied by a
plantoid, which is characterized by a reservoir capacity and energy resources
generated by the plantoid through its interaction with the local environ-
ment, each location’s plantoid has a location-specific (patch-related) energy
reservoir capacity. Plantoids play a role similar to the resource fountains of
Echo, however, they are self-replicating agents and each plantoid possesses
a characteristic chromosome chain, which determines the plantoid’s genetic
identity.
Chromosomes are defined as per Echo’s rules, in the sense that they
only share some of the characteristics of actual chromosomes. While actual
chromosomes have a much more complex relation with the general structure
of an organism, the chromosome in Echo’s artificial world is introduced with
two fundamental characteristics: the chromosome is the genetic material of
the agent; the chromosome determines the agent’s interface and interaction
2 We are using Netlogo’s terminology, in this case, since further on, the sim-
ulations analyzed will be from the Netlogo version of the model available at
http://modelingcommons.org/browse/one_model/3950#model_tabs_browse_procedures
(the procedures that implement the model can be consulted at this website).
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patterns, addressed in the model through tags that define these interactions,
the tags’ contents match the segments of the chromosome’s chain [5].
In a full artificial environment’s generality (that is, without trying to
match biology), one can assume a n letter formal alphabet to characterize the
genetic code. In the simulations section we will, however, consider Holland’s
four-letter code illustrative examples. Since similar results were obtained for
other values of n, we chose the formal alphabet size that matches Holland’s
Echo.
Plantoids, being fixed in the terrain, compete for territory, so that when-
ever, for a given plantoid, there is at least one neighbor, in a Moore neighbor-
hood3, with less than half the resources of the plantoid, then, the plantoid
replicates and its replica replaces the neighboring plantoid. Replication for
plantoids takes place such that the new replica is born with the same genetic
code as the parent, with a (low) probability of a one point mutation.
The presence of a new plantoid on a patch leads to a replenishment of
the energy resources at that patch to their maximum level, the simulational
assumption is that the new plantoid feeds from local organic material lead-
ing to its energy resources being set at their highest capacity possible for
the patch where the new plantoid is situated. The plantoids also have the
capability to replenish their energy resources at a certain replenishment rate
so that at each computation round, plantoids with energy below the local
maximum capacity replenish the resources at a fixed rate, which is one of the
model’s parameters. Plantoids can lose energy due to interaction with cog-0
and cog-1 agents, which feed upon plantoids’ energy resources.
Each m-agent (be it cog-0 or cog-1), as per Echo’s framework [4, 5], is
born with a given chromosome chain that specifies two tags: an offense tag
and a defense tag, the m-agents also have an energy reservoir capacity which
is equal to a base maximum level plus an extra level which is equal to the
length of their genetic code, a point which will be returned to further on.
Besides the chromosome chain, cog-1 agents are also characterized by three
more agent variables: desire to feed, desire to replicate and fear, each of these
variables are updated along the simulation.
The setup of initial values for a simulation begins by the definition of the
initial territory and the plantoid configuration, the energy resources’ reservoir
capacity of each plantoid depends upon the place at which the plantoid is,
3 The Moore neighborhood structure is comprised of eight neighbors surrounding the
plantoid, in the two-dimensional square lattice with periodic conditions at the borders.
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so that this is a patch-related variable, being linked to the interface between
plantoids and the territory’s geographical characteristics.
In the simulations, the reservoir capacity is initially set randomly for each
patch between 1 and a maximum plantoids’ energy reservoir capacity (global
parameter) with a discrete uniform distribution, as stated, all plantoids are
also set so that initially they all have their energy resources at the highest
reservoir capacity that the patch allows.
Each plantoid’s chromosome’s length is also set randomly with a discrete
uniform distribution between a length of 1 up to a maximum level which
corresponds to one of the model’s global parameters (called, in the model’s
code, “max-gen”). The initial values for the m-agents are set such that the
chromosome is built in two stages: the offense tag chromosome and the
defense tag chromosome. Both chromosomes’ lengths are set randomly with
uniform distribution between a length of 1 up to the previously mentioned
maximum level (“max-gen”).
In the general setting, as stated, the plantoids’ and m-agents genetic
codes are defined as sequences taken from a n-letter formal alphabet, at each
point in the chromosome sequence a letter is chosen randomly with equal
probability from the alphabet’s letters so that for a plantoid or a m-agent
with a chromosome of lengthm, the chromosome sequence will result from an
equiprobable random draw from the formal language of all m-length words.
For a m-agent, the full chromosome is a single chain comprised of the of-
fense tag sequence followed by the defense tag sequence which, taken together
in this way, make up the m-agent’s chromosome sequence.
The reservoir capacity of the m-agents is set equal to a global value of
m-agents’ energy reservoir capacity (called, in the model’s code, “agent-max-
reservoir”) plus an additional capacity equal to the length of their genetic
code, this is linked to replication procedures, in the sense that replication
only takes place (with a some probability) if the m-agent’s energy resources
exceeds a replication threshold, which is set, for each m-agent, equal to the
length of that agent’s genetic code. The m-agents’ reservoir is set initially to
its full capacity.
In a simulation, an initial number of m-agents is set to an even number
divided in two halves, one half composed of cog-1 agents and another half
composed of cog-0 agents, this equal number of cog-1 and cog-0 agents is
explained by the fact that given an equal number of cognitive types we aim
to evaluate which cognitive type tends to win the evolutionary race and
with what chances, depending upon relevant global parameters set at the
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beginning of the simulation.
At the beginning of the simulation4, the cog-1 m-agents set their initial
desire to replicate to 0 and evaluate their internal state. The evaluation of
internal state procedure programs the cog-1 m-agents to be able to assess
their internal energy requirements, synthesized in an emotional response of
desire to feed, the desire to feed will be defined as an internal response of the
agent to the proportion of energy reservoir that is empty (called proportion
of energy needs, expressed by the one minus the quotient between the cog-
1’s energy resources and the cog-1’s total reservoir capacity) the greater the
proportion of energy needs is, the greater is the desire to feed.
In the model, the cog-1s color changes (physiological response) depending
on the level of desire to feed, thus, the hungrier they are, the paler the
color is set, darker colors correspond to cog-1s that have less desire to feed,
this is programmed as physiological changes in their artificial bodies as a
consequence of the level of desire to feed.
One can speak, in this case, as argued next, of a “self-awareness” asso-
ciated with a calculus of survival, in the primitive sense of awareness which
resends to the notions of alertness and caution5, primitively, awareness indi-
cates a reinforced alertness, attention, caution, systemically and cognitively,
awareness can be linked to an intentional directedness towards an object
linked to objectives of survival.
“Self-awareness” can, therefore, be stated of any system’s cognitive dy-
namics in which the system addresses and regards itself with an alertness
that regards the system’s own survival. One can speak of “self-awareness”
with respect to artificial systems, whenever they possess the capability of
performing an internal evaluation regarding the sustainability of their activ-
ity or any aspect that is relevant for their continued functioning. This is not
a “self-awareness” of the same nature as human consciousness, nor intended
to be a line towards a simulation of human-like consciousness, rather, re-
garding the cog-1 agents we are dealing with artificial intelligent systems in
an artificial environment with programmed cognitive responses that furnish
these agents with responses that are aimed at self-preservation, including an
ability to evaluate their internal state, their relation to the environment and
what they must do in order to survive in the artificial “world”.
4 This corresponds to an initial setup procedure.
5 This is the Old English common root with wary, with the sense of being prudent,
alert. The root can be traced to the Proto-Germanic *ga-waraz, *ga (intensive prefix) and
waraz (wary, cautious).
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The cog-1 artificial agents, in this case, are programmed to evaluate their
internal energy resources and respond with a level of desire to feed, the desire
to feed allows for a linkage between the need to replenish their resources and
the future actions of feeding, thus, the artificial cognitive system is equipped
with an ability to evaluate its internal state of energy needs and reflect this
in its color and in any future decisions regarding its need for feeding, which
implies the introduction of a basic level of self-awareness in the artificial
system.
Taking into account what is stated above about human-like “self-awareness”
and human-like emotions, along with the fundamental differences between
these and the nature of the artificial system under research, the emotional
responses can, still, be assumed and programmed inspired by the human
neurobiological examples, as stated before, through the introduction of a
type of somatic computation that plays a similar role to the basic emotions
and somatic markers identified in human cognition regarding basic survival
scenarios as researched by Damásio [7], thus, in this case, the need to feed
is synthesized by a trigger alert for the agent, computed from its energy
needs, which warns the agent and plays a role in further adaptive cognitive
dynamics.
The simulation proceeds in rounds. At the beginning of each round the
plantoids replenish their energy resources. In this case, if the maximum
reservoir of a plantoid at a certain patch is not filled, then, its energy reservoir
is replenished by a fixed amount of replenishment rate, which is, in this
case, taken as a global parameter of the model, otherwise, if the plantoid’s
maximum reservoir is filled, then, its energy resources are kept at their peak
level, so that resource depletion can only come from m-agents’ feeding from
the plantoids’ energy resources.
The second step, in a round, is resource collection by m-agents, in this
case, the procedure depends upon a m-agent being a cog-0 or a cog-1. Cog-
0 agents limit themselves to collect energy resources from the plantoid on
the patch they are at, cog-1 agents are more elaborate in their deliberation
process. Before collecting energy resources the cog-1 m-agents begin by eval-
uating their internal state, so that their actions depend upon their desire to
feed. There is a choice facing the cog-1:
• It may stay on the patch where it is and feed from the plantoid there;
• It may move towards another patch, moving towards the nearest neigh-
boring place that contains the plantoid with the highest energy re-
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sources.
Each time a m-agent moves to a new patch (taking one step) its energy
reservoir drops by one unit, thus, moving consumes energy, which means
that a cog-1 faces a decision that may cost it one unit of energy and, in the
limit, its life, since death, for a m-agent, takes place whenever its energy
reservoir reaches zero or drops below zero.
The desire to feed, for a cog-1 m-agent, signalizes to the cog-1 how close
it is to death, thus if Rc(i) is the i-th m-agent’s maximum reservoir capacity
and R(i) is the cog-1’s current energy level, then, if that m-agent is a cog-1
agent, the agent’s desire level D(i) is given by the formula:
D(i) = 1−
R(i)
Rc(i)
(1)
The desire to feed is updated every time the cog-1 evaluates its internal state.
Solving the above equation for R(i) we get:
R(i) = (1−D(i))Rc(i) (2)
the closer to 1 the desire to feed is, the closer is the cog-1 to death. By pro-
gramming the cog-1 with the ability to evaluate its desire level and its maxi-
mum energy capacity Rc(i), the cog-1’s emotional response to energy require-
ments warn it whether or not it may move to a better location or stay on the
location it is at. The computation is the following: if (1−D(i))Rc(i)−1 = 0,
then, the next step the cog-1 takes without feeding means its death, therefore,
the cog-1 does not take any step, on the other hand, if (1−D(i))Rc(i)−1 >
0, then, the cog-1 can take one step to the patch that contains the plantoid
with the highest amount of energy resources6, after which the cog-1 evaluates
again its internal state, which triggers a new desire to feed level.
Risk, associated with death, is addressed by the cog-1 as an energy ex-
haustion and the cog-1’s programming allows for a systemic cognition aimed
at avoiding death. Moving to a “greener pasture” or not moving due to en-
ergy exhaustion are both linked to a systemic cognition that is aimed at the
organism’s survival and permanence in the game.
6 This corresponds to the moving to “greener pastures” behavior. The “greener pastures”
expression is literally so in Netlogo’s program procedures since there is an external color
expression of patches so that the greener the patch’s color is set, the greater is the amount
of energy resources of the corresponding plantoid.
2 The model 11
In this way, we can state that the cog-1 artificial organisms are knowledge
producers, in the sense that any production of knowledge is supported by
an organizing activity that acts intentionally according to the rules of the
system, towards the sustainable survival of the organism [8].
The laws of structure of an artificial organism are different from a non-
artificial one, artificial organisms are conditionned by the specific systemic
framework in which they are immersed, in this case, an artificial environment,
and by the program rules and restrictions imposed upon the program, but by
addressing each artificial organism as a systemic whole with specific survival
problems associated with the structure of the artificial environment allows
one to address that organism’s AI in terms of a cognition towards survival,
which approximates, in terms of a parallel correspondence, the intelligence
of the living organism and the intelligence of the artificial organism in some
fundamental aspects linked to survival, so that while the artificial system
has its own nature and rules that are specific to it and that are distinct from
the non-artificial system, it is still possible to immerse it in a problematic
context of survival and to build a cognition towards survival that parallels
that of the non-artificial system, in terms of a functionality and adaptivity
necessary to solve survival and sustainability problems, this is what is done
with the cog-1 agents.
While cog-1 agents deliberate before feeding, the cog-0, as stated before,
just feed from plantoid that is on the patch where they are located. The
feeding itself follows the same procedure for both cog-0 and cog-1 agents,
depending upon the interface of each m-agent in relation to the plantoid and
upon the number of m-agents feeding from the same plantoid. The interface
between m-agent and plantoid depends upon the matching of their respective
full chromosome chains, in particular, upon the offense tag of the m-agent
and the chromosome chain of the plantoid, this is based upon Holland’s Echo.
If the amount of resources of the plantoid at a given patch are greater
than zero, then, a comparison takes place between the offense tag component
of the chromosome of the m-agent and the plantoid’s chromosome. Thus, if
the m-agent’s offense tag is at least as large as the plantoid’s chromosome,
then, assuming that k is the length of the plantoid’s chromosome, the first
k letters of the m-agent’s offense tag are compared with the chromosome
string, if n+(i) is the number of matching letters and n−(i) the number of
non-matching letters, the matching level for the i-th m-agent is calculated
by the difference n+(i) − n−(i), which is between –k and k. To obtain a
2 The model 12
nonnegative interface score s(i) we set the score as follows:
s(i) = 0.5 · (n+(i)− n−(i) + k) + 1 (3)
which is between 1 and k + 1, the addition of one unit is explained by the
fact that, in feeding procedures, if all of the m-agents get 0 score we obtain
a division by zero, which causes problems.
If the m-agent offense tag is shorter than the plantoid’s chromosome,
then, if k is the length of the m-agent’s offense tag, a penalty is included
such that the score is halved:
s(i) = [0.5 · (n+(i)− n−(i) + k) + 1] · 0.5 (4)
which is between 0.5 and (k + 1)/2.
The comparison between the chromosomes introduces an evaluation scheme
for interfaces between organisms, in this case, between the m-agent and the
plantoid, if the m-agent is a match to the plantoid and is at least as com-
plex as the plantoid in regards to chromosome length, then, its interface is
such that it gets the maximum score, it is the best fit organism for feeding
from that plantoid, however, if the plantoid has a chromosome with a higher
length than the m-agent, even if the m-agent is a match it only matches a
substring of the plantoid’s chromosome, which means that, in this case, it
gets a penalty for its lower length.
Other scoring schemes are possible, the scheme introduced is due to the
goal of introducing a selection scheme for chromosome length, in the sense
that m-agents with a longer offense tag length not only have a greater diver-
sity of possible plantoid food sources, they also are able to get a differential
advantage when feeding from the same plantoid.
If the plantoid has energy resources, and a m-agent needs to feed (which
comes with an emotional response for a cog-1 and without an emotional
response for a cog-0), then, the m-agent feeds from the plantoid’s resources
in a proportion that is equal to the agent’s score divided by the total score
of the m-agents at that patch. Thus, there is a selective pressure resulting
from competition for access to the plantoid.
In regards to feeding, the difference between the two types of agents in
terms of adaptive response is that the cog-1 will make a deliberation, before
feeding, whether it should move and where to, a deliberation that depends
upon the programmed emotional response synthesized by the desire to feed.
There is a greater reflexivity in the cog-1’s cognitive dynamics that translates
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in a greater adaptivity around feeding. The second difference between the
two cognitive types arises in fighting.
After all m-agents have run through the feeding procedure, they enter
into a second set of procedures regarding predatory dynamics. All m-agents
whose energy reservoir is not full look for a prey to fight with and from which
they can steal energy resources. The cog-0 fight with whatever other m-agent
they find themselves facing, which means that the cog-0 are fully exposed to
the risk of either winning or losing, in their predatory behavior.
In predatory mode, the cog-1 are more cautious, namely, the cog-1 look
to the potential prey and anticipate the result of the confrontation which
means that the cog-1 run the scenario of the confrontation, the result of this
scenario triggers a dynamics of fear and desire, such that the fear cognitive
dynamics is, in this case, programmed in terms of an emotional response to
the confrontation itself, while the desire cognitive dynamics results from the
prospect of feeding from the prey’s energy resources.
The fear versus desire artificial cognitive processing, incorporated in the
cog-1’s AI, allows the cog-1 agents to produce cognitive syntheses aimed at
adaptive responses regarding the anticipation of conflict, signalizing to the
cog-1 agent the risk involved in the conflict situation which may allow the
agent to avoid harmful conflicts and seek favorable conflicts, reducing the
exposure to conflict risk.
The first stage of conflict is as follows, a m-agent (be it cog-0 or cog-
1), in predatory mode, seeks and meets with another m-agent on the same
patch. The conflict takes place in such a way that the predator attacks, the
prey defends and counterattacks, which means that the predator also has to
defend. Using Echo’s rules, for the transfer of resources from prey to predator
(due to the predator’s attack), a comparison is made between the offense tag
of the predator and the defense tag of the prey, for the transfer of resources
from predator to prey (due to the prey’s counterattack), a comparison is
made between the defense tag of the predator and the offense tag of the
prey.
The score is set in the same way as for the m-agent/plantoid interaction,
so that the scoring scheme above also holds for the matching between an
offense tag and a defense tag, instead of an offense tag and a plantoid chro-
mosome. Denoting the predator by the index i and the prey by the index j
we have the two scores, that we now explain:
s (ij) = [0.5 · (n+ (ij)− n− (ij) + kij) + 1] · uij (5)
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s (ji) = [0.5 · (n+ (ji)− n− (ji) + kji) + 1] · uji (6)
In equation (5), s (ij) is the score from the comparison between the predator’s
offense tag and the prey’s defense tag, n+ (ij)−n− (ij) is the matching level
between the predator’s offense tag and the prey’s defense tag and kij is the
length of the longest tag in a comparison between the length of the predator’s
offense tag and the prey’s defense tag, uij is a penalty which, in a similar way
as equations (3) and (4), is set to 1 if the predator has the longest tag or if the
tag’s have comparable size and to 0.5 if the predator has the shortest length
tag7, in this way the scheme for m-agent/plantoid interaction is brought now
to the predator’s attack to the prey.
The score s (ji), in equation (6), is the score from the comparison between
the prey’s offense tag and the predator’s defense tag, n+ (ji)− n− (ji) is the
matching level between the prey’s offense tag and the predator’s defense tag
and kji is the length of the longest tag in a comparison between the length of
the prey’s offense tag and the predator’s defense tag, uji is a penalty which
is set to 1 if the prey has the longest tag and to 0.5 if the two tags are
comparable in size or if the prey has the shortest length tag8. A prey can
have an advantage in the interaction if its score is higher than the predator’s,
the transfer of resources due to the confrontation is defined as follows:
T (ji) = R (j)
s (ij)
s (ij) + s (ji)
(7)
T (ij) = R (i)
s (ji)
s (ij) + s (ji)
(8)
In equation (7), T (ji) represent the resources’ amount received by the preda-
tor, therefore, transferred from the prey to the predator, the predator gets a
proportion of the total resources of the prey (R (j)) equal to its relative score
in the confrontation (s (ij) / (s (ij) + s (ji))), in the same way, from equation
(8), it follows that the resources’ amount transferred from the predator to the
prey, represented by T (ij), is such that the prey gets a proportion of the total
resources of the predator (R (i)) equal to its relative score in the confronta-
tion (s (ji) / (s (ij) + s (ji))). The amount of resources transferred depend
upon the predator and the prey’s energy reservoirs level at the moment of
confrontation and upon their genetic makeup.
7 Selection pressure on the prey is, thus, for longer defense tags, these present an ad-
vantage to the prey.
8 Selection on the prey is for longer offense tags used by a prey in counter attack.
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When conflict takes place which means the predator’s new energy reser-
voir level is set to:
min [R (i) + T (ji)− T (ij) , Rc (i)] (9)
where Rc (i) is the predator’s maximum energy reservoir capacity, the formula
R (i)+T (ji)−T (ij) means that the predator receives energy resources from
the prey, but also loses energy resources to the prey, if that transference
equals or surpasses the predator’s reservoir, then, the reservoir is filled to its
maximum capacity, on the other hand, if R (i) + T (ji) − T (ij) ≤ 0, that
is, if the energy resource loss surpasses both the resources received and the
agent’s reservoir, then, the predator dies. For a prey (cog-0 or cog-1) we get
a similar result for the new energy reservoir level:
min [R (j) + T (ij)− T (ji) , Rc (j)] (10)
Unlike cog-0 in predatory mode, who engage the prey no matter what,
cog-1 predators evaluate, first. the potential prey and anticipate the result
of the resource transfer, which means that they can form an expectation as
to the outcome of the confrontation. Two emotional responses are involved
here, the fear of confrontation is triggered by the antecipatory perception
of the outcome of the confrontation, it is set, in this case, to the relative
proportion of resources transferred, so that the fear level is set as:
F (ij) =
T (ij)
T (ij) + T (ji)
(11)
thus, the cog-1 predator fears the confrontation by a level equal to the relative
proportion of resources transferred to the prey over the total amount of
resources transferred in the conflict. The cog-1 predator’s desire, in turn, is
set to:
D (ij) = 1− F (ij) =
T (ji)
T (ij) + T (ji)
(12)
so that the predator fears the transference of energy resources to the prey
and desires the transference of resources from the prey. If the fear surpasses
the desire F (ij) > D (ij), then the cog-1 predator knows that the prey has
the advantage in the conflict, since it will transfer more resources to the prey
than those that it will receive from the prey, on the other hand, if the fear
does not surpass the desire F (ij) ≤ D (ij), then the cog-1 predator knows
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that it has the advantage in the conflict, since it will receive at least the
same resources from the prey as those that it will lose to the prey. If the fear
of conflict is greater than the desire, the cog-1 color turns yellow (artificial
physiological response) and the cog-1 avoids the conflict, if the fear of conflict
does not surpass the desire, the cog-1 color turns red (artificial physiological
response) and the cog-1 attacks its prey.
Cog-1 preys, under attack by another m-agent in predatory mode, also
make an analogous evaluation, calculating the fear level as:
F (ji) =
T (ji)
T (ij) + T (ij)
(13)
and the desire level as:
D (ji) = 1− F (ji) =
T (ij)
T (ij) + T (ij)
(14)
the physiological response to fear versus desire is the same, even though if
attacked by the predator, the prey must defend itself9.
After a m-agent runs through its predatory stage it implements the repli-
cation procedure. If the agent has gathered enough energy resources surpass-
ing the replication threshold (defined as the length of its genetic code), then
the agent replicates, with some probability10.
When replication takes place, it is such that the new m-agent receives the
same chromosome as the parent with a low probability of a one-point muta-
tion. This means that the offense and defense tags will, generally, coincide,
except in the cases of a one-point mutation. The new m-agent also inherits
the replication threshold, maximum reservoir capacity and cognitive type of
the parent with no transition probability from cog-1 to cog-0 or from cog-0
to cog-111. The parent gives half its energy resources to the newborn.
9 Modifications of the model might include the cog-1 prey’s possibility of escaping the
predator with a certain probability, or depending upon certain sections of the chromosome.
10 We do not assume that replication necessarily takes place. Thus, we introduce a
random component to replication, so that a m-agent may or may not replicate. The
replication probability is usually set to a high value.
11 This is done, in order to be able to compare the performance of the two populations
(cog-0 and cog-1). An evolutionary game where the cognitive type could be changed would
introduce another type of framework, which can, however, be used in future simulations.
In the present case, the intention was to separate the genetic profile from the cognitive
profile in order to evaluate the differential advantage of different AI systems, that is, the
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A number of physiological changes are introduced to cog-1 agents, when
they are replicating, namely, when their energy reservoir surpasses their repli-
cation threshold this triggers their desire to replicate (which is set to 1), and
they change their color to pink (physiological response). After replication
their desire to replicate is reset to 0, and they reevaluate their internal state.
Cog-1 newborns also evaluate their internal state as soon as they are born.
After confrontation and replication, those m-agents whose energy re-
sources become depleted (agent reservoir of zero or below) die. The last
procedure left for m-agents is a moving procedure, but before moving, a new
procedure enters, here, into play, which is the plantoids’ reaction to m-agents’
by releasing a poison that depletes the energy of the m-agents by one unit,
thus, m-agents that have lost all their energy resources or m-agents that could
not gather more than 1 unit of energy resources will die after the plantoids
poison release.
When a m-agent survives the whole sequence of energy resources harvest-
ing, predator/prey dynamics, replication and the poison release by plantoids,
then, that agent has survived the round so far, in this case, the agent can
move to another location12. Cog-1, as stated before, only move if they have
enough energy to do so, that is, if the energy is greater than 1 unit, since
otherwise, moving would lead to energy depletion, if they have enough en-
ergy to move, as already stated, they move to the nearest patch with the
greatest energy resources. Cog-0 move no matter what and do it randomly,
which means that those cog-0 that have only one unit of energy will die in
the process of moving.
The last procedure of the model is named competition and is a plan-
toid procedure, defining plantoids’ replication rules. Thus, as stated before,
whenever a plantoid has at least one neighbor (in a Moore neighboorhood)
with less than half its energy resources the plantoid replicates, replacing with
its replica one of the randomly chosen neighbors that conforms to this con-
dition. Replication takes place in such a way that the new plantoid has the
same chromosome as the parent but with a low probability of a one-point
mutation. The new plantoid replicator has an energy reservoir at the full ca-
purpose was to evaluate whether, given the same global conditions regarding environment
and genetic profiles, under which cases the cog-1 AI provides an advantage over cog-0, in
terms of adaptive performance.
12 This is included, in the Netlogo model, in the poison release code section, after the
poison release procedure, in this sense, the moving procedure by m-agents can also be
considered an adaptive response to the plantoids’ poison release.
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pacity allowed by the patch, which is justified by its consumption of organic
materials available at the patch so that the new organism is able to replenish
the energy resources to full capacity.
These are the model’s main procedures. We now analyze Netlogo’s sim-
ulation results.
3 Simulations
The model’s coevolutionary dynamics is such that the m-agents play a role
in plantoid coevolution, by feeding off plantoids depleting their energy re-
sources they allow for plantoids to replicate due to local energy resources’
differences, which means that the m-agents play a role in the plantoids’ com-
petition dynamics. On the other hand, the plantoids also play a role in the
m-agents coevolution, both at the level of the genetically-determined inter-
face (connected to feeding procedures) as well as at the level of the killing of
m-agents due to poison release at the end of the round, before replication,
which means that only the replicators that are most efficient in their energy
gathering are able to survive.
A cog-1 m-agent has an evolutionary advantage over a cog-0 at the mov-
ing, feeding and fighting levels. In moving, the cog-1 conserves more energy
since it only moves if it has enough energy do do so and, when it moves,
it goes towards “greener pastures”, which increases its chances of gathering
more energy resources during feeding. Although this advantage does not al-
ways occur. Indeed, the “moving to greener pastures” procedure is a heuristic
one, the cog-1 identifies plantoids nearby, with greater amount of energy re-
sources, however it is only able to discover if its interface is fit when it starts
to feed. This is a purposeful assumption, since it allows for imprecise adap-
tation, so that the cog-1 addresses its environment in terms of what it can
perceive, with insufficient information being present.
The “moving to greener pastures” procedure also leaves room for experi-
mental expansion in terms of the cog-1’s AI, namely higher reflexivity levels
going up the scale from basic emotional responses to higher degrees of aware-
ness with the formation of internal models of the world, including the ability
to form an internal map of the territory built from the ability for geographic
recollection. Since the purpose of the current model is only to address ba-
sic emotional responses we chose not to address, at this early stage, these
higher reflexivity levels, which will have to deal with expanded levels of self-
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awareness13.
In conflict procedures, the cog-1 in predatory mode also has advantage
over the cog-0, since it only attacks if it anticipates an advantage to do so, the
cog-0 does not have this antecipatory ability, it sees only the present. The
reduced reflexive ability of the cog-0, that is unable to reflect how close it is
to death, meaning that it moves even if that kills it and fights, even if that
depletes more its energy resources, make the cog-0 a very basic replicator, its
selective advantage is solely at the level of its offense and defense tags, and
immediate surroundings.
The cog-1, being always aware of how close it is to death, of its feeding
needs and of its surroundings and fighting advantages, is able to gather and
conserve more energy and so make it less probable to be killed from poison
release and other threats. Also a cog-1 with a smaller genetic advantage in
terms of offense and defense tags, may be able to compensate through its
more expanded adaptive cognitive abilities than the cog-0.
Taking into account these factors it is expected that cog-1s, in general,
tend to dominate, in particular in the cases of harsh environments. This
is shown to be the case in repeated simulations: the cog-0 agents tend to
become extinct in harsh environments, while the cog-1 agents can prosper,
attaining sustainable population numbers.
Thus, for instance, in no simulation of the model have we found cog-
0 surviving when the plantoids’ maximum reservoir capacity is set to 10
units14, which is a small value that introduces a strong selective pressure for
m-agents who must survive in an environment of low abundance. In this
case, we always observed cog-0 becoming extinct, with cog-1 winning the
evolutionary race over the cog-0. However, the resilience of cog-0 populations
strongly depends upon the world size and the maximum chromosome length.
The world size tends to provide cog-0 agents greater chances of dispersing
and finding food sources, lowering the environmental stress. Another factor
of survival found in the simulation of the model is that cog-1 agents tend
to spontaneously aggregate forming feeding colonies or even nomadic groups
that move in tandem (discussed further on). When these groups are abundant
they can compensate the environment’s harsher conditions and survive, cog-0
can find high energy resources in cog-1 colonies, however, these colonies also
13 The agent has to be programmed to remember itself on that place before.
14 Which means that each plantoid-harboring patch is initially set with discrete uniform
probability a maximum energy reservoir capacity of up to 10 units.
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present a risk for the cog-0 in the sense that it can be fed upon by cog-1
agents in predatory mode that only attack when they have the advantage.
The spontaneous aggregation of cog-1 agents in feeding colonies is, in
part, explained by the way in which they decide whether to move or whether
they should stay on one place, they only move if they find an advantage, and
they always move to the local place with the highest energy resources, which
means that they tend to aggregate on places with higher energy resources and
stay at those places or, alternatively, move to a better place in the vicinities,
but this motion is directed, only dispersing in some instances where there
are multiple local plantoids with large amounts of resources. In this way, the
cog-1 tend to aggregate in groups that tend to move in tandem or in large
feeding colonies.
Considering the Netlogo’s base system of coordinates, which places the
origin at the central lattice site, and a square lattice of −r and +r extremes
both horizontally and vertically, means that, for different values of r, the
lattice will be composed of (2r + 1)× (2r + 1) lattice sites (called patches in
Netlogo). Table 1. below shows the statistics for the time to extinction of cog-
0 agents for 10,000 repeated simulations with r = 2, 3, ..., 10, and plantoids’
maximum reservoir capacity of 10 units. While, in each group of 10,000
repeated simulations, for each lattice size, the cog-0 agents always became
extinct, the mean time to extinction increases as the lattice size increases.
Even though the growth in mean seems to slow down. The median shows a
more stable behavior increasing for lattice sizes of 7x7 up to 13x13 and then
stabilizing from 13x13 up to 19x19, increasing again for the 21x21 lattice.
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Lattice Mean 95% Conf. Int. Median Skewness Minimum Maximum
7x7 13.85 ]13.74,13.97[ 13 1.68 4 74
9x9 15.01 ]14.89,15.12[ 14 1.32 3 57
11x11 15.43 ]15.32,15.55[ 14 1.21 3 58
13x13 15.84 ]15.72,15.95[ 15 1.32 3 70
15x15 16.12 ]16.01,16.24[ 15 1.34 4 89
17x17 16.4 ]16.28,16.52 15 1.19 2 69
19x19 16.44 ]16.32,16.56[ 15 1.16 4 60
21x21 16.66 ]16.54,16.78[ 16 1.13 3 64
Tab. 1: Statistical results of time to extinction of cog-0 agents, for repeated
Netlogo simulations, 10,000 repeated simulations were performed for
each lattice size, the main parameters used were: maximum chro-
mosome length, 20; maximum plantoid reservoir capacity, 10 units;
maximum (base) m-agents’ reservoir capacity, 10 units; mutation
probability 0.001; replenishment rate, 2 units; replication probabil-
ity, 0.9; inital number of m-agents 20 (divided in 10 cog-0 and 10
cog-1).
The skewness of the time to extinction distribution shows a positively
skewed distribution which means that the lower time to extinction values
tend to dominate, with a few less probable situations in which the cog-0 live
for longer periods. The skewness tends to become smaller as the lattice size
increases. Also, regarding the minimum time to extinction, the values are
situated bewteen 2 to 4 ticks, a tick constituting a whole computing cycle
that ends with the poison release and plantoid replication. The maximum,
on the other hand, is situated between 60 and 89 ticks.
In the same way as increasing lattice size influences positively the cog-
0 populations’ resilience, so does the maximum chromosome length. The
following figure shows the boxplots, for the cog-0’s time to extinction, from
10,000 repeated simulations, for maximum chromosome lengths of 5, 10, 15
and 20, respectively. Each distribution shows evidence of outliers to the right,
of the boxplot, while the box is almost at the center of the lowest and highest
non-outlier values. The distribution for the simulation data, obtained for
maximum chromosome length of 5, shows a tendency to concentrate on lower
time to extinction, which indicates a smaller resilience for cog-0 replicators,
in this case.
There is, also, a lower outlier for the length 5 data, which is a case where,
3 Simulations 22
at the first simulation round, all the cog-0 became extinct. Excluding the
outliers, the boxplots still show the tendency of lower maximum chromo-
some lengths to lead to the lower extinction times, while for the other larger
chromosome lengths there seems to be a greater convergence in distribution.
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Fig. 1: Boxplots of time to extinction of cog-0 agents, for repeated Netlogo
simulations, 10,000 repeated simulations were performed for maxi-
mum chromosome lengths of 5, 10, 15 and 15 the main parameters
used were: maximum plantoid reservoir capacity, 10 units; maximum
(base) m-agents’ reservoir capacity, 10 units; mutation probability
0.001; replenishment rate, 2 units; replication probability, 0.9; inital
number of m-agents 20 (divided in 10 cog-0 and 10 cog-1), lattice size
19x19.
Thus, while in harsh environments the cog-0 always go extinct, there are
factors that may contribute to a higher resilience. The critical parameter
is the plantoids’ maximum reservoir capacity, if this parameter is increased
for sufficiently high values, there start to occur cases of stabilization with
sustainable coexistence of cog-0 and cog-1 agents, however, in harsh environ-
ments the cog-1 are favored.
Group coevolutionary dynamics is a key factor in cog-1 agents’ survival,
indeed, by simulating the model only with cog-0 one finds, in repeated sim-
ulations of the model, that they always go extinct in harsh environments,
while cog-1 agents may survive and even prosper. This result does not crit-
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ically depend upon the number of letters in the formal alphabet, thus, for
two-letter, three-letter, four-letter or n > 4-letter alphabets we still get the
same profile.
We now consider the resilience of cog-1 populations addressing a low
plantoids’ maximum energy reservoir capacity corresponding to harsh envi-
ronments. While cog-0, as shown above, become extinct at this level of harsh
conditions, the cog-1 agents show two dynamical patterns:
• Logistic-like growth towards a high number of agents, which form small
groups and large clusters corresponding to feeding colonies;
• Exponential growth followed by a staircase-like breakdown with a very
long time of persisting small groups.
In the first pattern, the cog-1 agents prosper, even despite the harsh con-
ditions, the feeding colonies seem to play a role in this, providing energy
resources that allow the agents to persist for longer times and yielding sus-
tainable high populations of cog-1 agents. In the second pattern, there is an
initial exponential growth but the cog-1 agents do not form large colonies,
rather they peak in number and then fall progressively in numbers to very
low groups (usually below 6 individuals), these groups tend to move together
and survive for very long spans of time, they do not gather enough energy to
be able to replicate, however, they are able to gather enough energy moving
together and feeding off plantoids’ and each other’s energy. The survival
time spans of these m-agents surpasses largely the survival time spans of
cog-0 agents who become extinct when they reach such low numbers, with-
out sufficient energy to replicate.
The key factors lie, on the one hand, in the cog-1 agents’ adaptive cog-
nition, which leads to a better energy management and, on the other hand,
in the emergent aggregation dynamics, but while the better energy manage-
ment is indeed relevant, when the cog-1 groups break up, individuals tend to
die sooner, which means that the aggregation in groups provides a key factor
in small population resilience.
While only a logic of competition was introduced, the cog-1 seem to co-
evolve to make emerge aggregation and a primitive form of cooperation not
present in the individual programming, this is a collective effect. Some groups
are formed by cog-1 agents and their replicas but this is not a condition
for group formation, individuals with different chromosomes may aggregate,
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groups may even merge and form larger groups or break up, so that aggre-
gation is not fixed.
As an illustrating example, in a simulation with maximum chromosome
length set to 20, with a two-letter alphabet, an initial number of 10 cog-1
agents, with maximum energy reservoir of plantoids chosen set to 10 as well
as m-agents’ maximum base reservoir capacity set to 10, a replicating chance
of 0.9, a mutation probability of 0.001, and a 21×21 torus, we found an quick
growth to 20 cog-1 agents which then started to fall, remaining 6 replicators
only, which moved together, did not replicate and continued to be alive for
a very long span, so that at 251,500 ticks two cog-1 agents died, four cog-1
agents still remaining alive at 370,000 ticks, which still joined in groups, also
breaking up from time to time. These large survival time spans of low density
populations with low energy resources (therefore not being able to replicate),
are not found in cog-0 agents, such low population numbers eventually tend
to become extinct, however, the time it takes for them to become extinct, in
the case of cog-1 agents, tends to largely surpass the time for extinction of
cog-0 agents.
There is an emerging mutualism associated with the small cog-1 groups
that is also present in the feeding colonies’ dynamics. The figure below shows
an example of a simulation only with cog-1 agents, with a very extreme
condition of 5 maximum energy units of plantoids’ reservoir capacity. In this
case, of an even harsher environment than that with 10 maximum energy
units, the cog-0 cannot survive, but the cog-1 can prosper, in the figure
below an example is shown, where several small number groups coexist with
feeding colonies present at several sites. The simulation started with 20 cog-1
agents, and the population increased to a fluctuation band between 200 and
300 m-agents. The image was taken from the 4,000th tick.
In the figure are some clusters, where there appear more than one m-
agent), and many “apparent” individual agents scattered throughout the ter-
ritory, this is apparent because most of these individual agents are actually
superimposed groups of agents that move in tandem like one, and are only
identifiable through local inspection of the patch, this is a feature of the
cog-1’s nomadic groups.
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Fig. 2: Netlogo simulation example, figure corresponds to the 4000-th tick,
in a simulation with parameters: maximum chromosome length, 20;
maximum plantoid reservoir capacity, 5 units; maximum m-agents’
(base) reservoir capacity, 10 units; mutation probability 0.001; re-
plenishment rate, 2.5 units; replication probability, 0.9; inital number
of m-agents, 10 cog-1 agents, lattice size 21x21. The apparent dis-
persed individual agents are actually groups of agents superimposed
on the same patch.
For illustrative purposes, the following figure shows another simulation
with the same parameters but a maximum plantoid reservoir capacity of
80 units. While the behavior is the same in the formation of groups and
large clusters and the nomadic groups, the population numbers reach a band
between 600 and 700.
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Fig. 3: Netlogo simulation example, figure corresponds to the 4000-th tick,
in a simulation with same parameters as figure 2, but with maximum
plantoid reservoir capacity of 80 units instead of 5.
There is a form of mutalism that emerges in the model, in the sense
that the programmed predatory procedure and the agents’ motion seem to
make the group formation and large clusters a key for survival, allowing for
a group-level energy management that prevent extinction in harsh environ-
ments, where the cog-0 agents cannot survive.
4 Emotional responses and artificial systems
The development of research on emotions in artificial systems can be linked,
on the one hand, to the development and introduction of robots and intel-
ligent systems that can interact better with us in society, and, on the other
hand, to the development of technologies with greater adaptability to com-
plex scenarios, the current article explores this last venue, dealing with an
artificial ecology of coevolving artificial agents capable of basic reflexive re-
sponses that exhibit a cognitive dynamics that can be addressed analogously
in terms of paralellism, in human organisms, to emotional responses in sur-
vival contexts, in this case, dealing with basic survival situations: desire to
feed, fear of conflict and desire to replicate.
One cannot state that the artificial cog-1 agents of the model exhibit
emotional responses like humans, nor that they are self-aware in the way
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humans are [9], these are different natures that we are dealing with, different
systems, however, the parallelism holds in the sense that we introduced an
artificial somatic calculatory ability that programs the agents to respond
adaptively to their internal state and to the virtual environment in which
they “live”.
The cog-1 agents, in the Echo-based model, have a survival-directed cogni-
tion, namely, they evaluate their internal state and address the environment,
addressing it in a way that increases their survival chances. Their desire
to feed leads them to look for places that have higher quantity of energy
resources, however, before moving to a place to harvest they evaluate how
close they are to death, and only move if they find that they have enough
energy to do that. In predatory situations they also anticipate the outcome
of confrontation and only attack if they find that they will benefit more from
that confrontation.
Each activity is mediated by a calculatory system that introduces a so-
matic computation that leads to a level of awareness distinct from that of
the biological system but that nonetheless can be stated in regards to the
artificial system which is built in a likeness to the biological system. We can
state, for instance, that a cog-1 is aware of its own feeding needs because
it produces a cognitive synthesis (calculated from its energy requirements)
upon which it can act towards increasing its chances of survival.
The fact that such a cognitive synthesis is produced by mathematical
rules, performed by the agent, in nothing diminishes the fact that the agent
has indeed produced a cognitive synthesis upon which it may act, and that is
supported by an organizing activity that acts intentionally according to the
rules of the system (the system’s laws of structure), aimed at the sustainable
survival of the system itself, in this sense, as argued in the main text, one
can speak of a basic form of self-awareness.
Self-awareness in artificial systems can, thus, be linked to an internal eval-
uation of the system playing an adaptive role in the system’s processing and
activity. In the Echo model we are dealing with programmed response types
that the agents’ AI trigger automatically when faced with adaptive problems,
these response types link the agents’ information processing regarding their
needs to the environmental conditions for survival directed actions, through
cognitive syntheses that are performed through a survival directed calcula-
tory dynamics which plays a role akin to the role that emotions play in human
organisms and in human decision making [7]. These can, thus, be stated to
constitute artificial emotional responses in the sense that they correspond,
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in the artificial organism, to a dynamics that parallels the human emotional
responses in similar adaptive frameworks.
Thus, the organism’s adaptive cognition triggers a feeding desire response
which will influence the organism’s calculatory basis for interaction with the
environment (in this case, involved with moving and feeding interactions
with other agents: plantoids and other m-agents). The generalization of this
approach to artificial intelligence, in appropriate adaptive contexts, may be
useful to agilize a context-dependence and basic survival sensible solutions on
the part of artificial systems, making them closer to the adaptive plasticity
of biological systems.
Further experiments in the Echo framework for complex adaptive systems’
research and in other theoretical and applied frameworks, ranging from ALife
and multiagent simulations to robotic systems (which possess a physical body
and, therefore, a physical interface) are necessary to evaluate the potential
effectiveness in different frameworks of such an approach.
In each of these cases Echo, general ALife, multiagent simulations and
robotics, there is a common ground: the agent is addressed as an integrated
whole and a somatic computation dynamics is introduced. Somatic com-
putation, which underlies artificial emotional responses, entail the need to
address the agent as an integrated whole, taking into account the agent’s
body (soma) and interface with the environment, which includes perception
and physical action. In this sense, we are dealing with the agent in terms of
an organism, and the agent’s cognition as analogous to an organism’s cog-
nition. The Kismet robot, as well as the present Echo-based model, already
integrate some of these elements.
While, in the Echo-based model, the cog-1 agents’ emotions are directly
connected to basic survival problems linked to activities necessary to keep
the agents alive, in particular, linked to feeding, moving, interacting with
other agents and replication, Kismet’s emotional responses are based upon
a basic sociability problem, so that the Kismet adapts to social interaction
and sensory stimuli [10].
The interface and type of adaptive problems are central in what regards
emotions and somatic processing, so that a few basic questions always need
to be taken into account: what type of body does an agent possess? What are
the agent’s basic adaptation problems and how do they relate to its body’s
functionalities? How does the agent relate to the environment?
The type and programming of emotional responses depend upon answer-
ing questions such as those above. Thus, different bodies imply different
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interfaces with the environment, different functionalities and different basic
adaptive responses. Emotions are placed at the level of an integrated dy-
namics that involves a perception system, a self-regulatory system and an
adaptive computation system.
In our case, the cog-1 creatures possess preprogrammed bodies and “live”
on an artificial simulation environment, generated by a computer, their sur-
vival problems are linked to programmed rules of a game that is based in
biology: “life”, in the artificial environment, is linked to presence and ex-
istence in that environment, death can take place in the simulation in the
sense that the artificial creature is removed from the simulation, no longer is
present, no longer exists in the simulation.
Kismet’s problem is a sociability problem. Being a robot, Kismet is a
physical system, it does not reside in an artificial simulation whose rules
were programmed. Artificial simulations can be set up so as to change the
rules to differ from those of the physical world, a robot is an existent in the
physical world.
The robot’s interface is a physical interface and the relation between
functionality and adaptation problems is directly built in the robot: the robot
is built with certain functionalities, perceptive systems and computational
responses to a physical environment [10].
Kismet was built so as to be capable of social interaction and expressing
emotional responses, mimicking recognizable human facial expressions which
become the external expressions of what, in terms of human parallelism,
constitute basic emotional responses to external stimuli15.
The basic emotional responses are associated, in Kismet, with the robot’s
artificial homeostatic regulatory dynamics. The basic needs of the robot are
represented by basic “drives”, when the Kismet’s needs are met, the intensity
level of each “drive” is set within a certain “desired regime”, on the other hand,
as the intensity level moves away from the homeostatic regime, Kismet’s
motivation leads it to a stronger engagement in behaviors that restore that
“drive”16.
Emotions, for Kismet, are based on appraisals of benefit or detriment of
a given stimulus, so that the robot evokes what are programmed positive
“emotive responses” that lead it closer to the stimulus, or negative “emotive
15 As illustrated in http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-
group/kismet/kismet.html.
16 As explained in http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/sociable/kismet.html
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responses” that lead it away from the stimulus. Six basic “emotive responses”
are modelled, as artificial analogs of anger, disgust, fear, joy, sorrow and
surprise, along with three more arousal-based responses that correspond to
interest, calm and boredom17.
The major difference between Kismet and the cog-1 agents, at this level,
is that Kismet is intended at a self-organizing communication circuit with
a human agent, that is, the “emotive responses” are aimed at promoting
empathy from a human caretaker, playing a central role in regulating social
interaction with the human, so that these are aimed at future human and
robot interactions.
The cog-1 agents’ emotional responses are aimed at adaptive scenarios
towards survival, they are associated with decision making towards solving
adaptive problems about keeping an autonomous agent in a coevolutionary
artificial environment. Sociability was an emergent pattern in cog-1, which is
mostly engaged in its own survival, in that engagement, it is able to sponta-
neously aggregate with other cog-1 agents forming cohesive long term groups
that move as if they are one larger adaptive agent, a central behavioral pat-
tern associated with aggregation in complex adaptive systems [5].
A cog-1-like robot would be built not necessarily towards a human and
robot social context interaction like Kismet, it could be built so that it would
be furnished with a basic survival kit towards autonomous action, including
self-preservation and adaptation to changing environments.
Damásio’s research has shown that, in human agents, emotions play a
central role in decision making allowing it to be faster and more context sen-
sitive, increasing adaptiveness in decision making problems [7]. Emotions, in
humans, allow us to respond to threats and identify opportunities, to decide
more quickly as stressed by Kaku [11]. Without emotions, we would become
paralized by endless decisions all with the same weight, in this sense, arti-
ficial agents that have a cognitive processing analogous to basic emotional
responses, incorporated in their adaptive computing systems, may prove cen-
tral for the development of robots capable of making judgments in complex
situations, including, for instance, rescue situations linked to natural disas-
ters.
Another application, on the other hand, to which the present work is
ultimately aimed at, is multiagent modelling: being able to incorporate emo-
tional responses in artificial agents may allow applications of multiagent mod-
17 As explained in http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/sociable/kismet.html.
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elling to human systems with greater predictive ability, which may prove use-
ful not only to social sciences but also to industrial applications (for instance,
infrastructure design that needs to take into account human behavior).
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